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Gutiérrez in Ecuador in 2002, the violent protests in Bolivia in 2003 that led to the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, and the election of Tabaré Vásquez to the Uruguayan presidency in 2004. These events reflect the differential impact of recent economic reforms and show that in Latin America, once again, a prior consensus on economic policy is breaking down.
Neoliberal reforms produced some positive results. Inflation was brought down, new infusions of foreign investment occurred, and economic growth in the early 1990s was far higher than it had been during the "lost decade" of the 1980s. But the reforms have had an uneven impact across and within social sectors, and since 1997 growth has slowed and new investment has declined. In light of these developments, the debate on the impacts of neoliberal reform on the economies, polities, and societies of Latin American countries has heated up (see, e.g., Huber and Solt, 2004; Stallings and Peres, 2000; Walton, 2004; Weyland, 2004) . Stallings and Peres (2000) show that inequality of incomes in the region has increased and, except in Chile, so has poverty. Formal-sector employment has declined slightly, and economic openness has not led to a revitalization of firms or enhanced worker productivity across the board; instead, islands of efficiency and productivity exist in a sea of mediocre performances at the micro level. Huber and Solt (2004: 158) argue that more liberalized economies in the region had higher volatility, larger increases in income inequality, and greater poverty than less liberalized economies. These academic studies have been challenged, 1 but they lend empirical support to the widespread disenchantment with neoliberal reform in Latin America.
One element that is missing from the debate is the role of ideas. Why and how were neoliberal ideas accepted in the first place, and how did policy elites formulate and implement neoliberal policies? Why weren't these ideas and policies sustainable? How might a new consensus on better and more inclusive economic policies be forged in the ashes of the Washington Consensus? This article attempts to answer these questions. It argues that the neoliberalism of the 1980s and 1990s lost its credibility and its capacity to provide politically feasible policy guidelines because it was based on an elitist, exclusionary pact among small groups of experts and elites representing the interests of transnational capital. This situation calls for a paradigm shift involving a reelaboration of development strategies in favor of majorities.
The first section of this article reviews a historical debate about the global economic crisis between the world wars and suggests how it has evolved. The next four sections argue for the importance of ideas in the analysis of economic policy, chart the rise and decline of the Washington Consensus, with an emphasis on the mechanisms by which economic ideas have been disseminated in Latin America, and discuss the new questions for the research and policy agenda that this collapse implies.
This analysis is offered from a critical point of view in the hope that it may not only provide a better understanding of the recent past but inform current debates about the way forward in economic policy making in Latin America. It is our conviction that the contested character of the recent reform process requires a revisionist exercise that unveils the shortcomings of prior policies and paves the way for innovative ideas that address the material aspirations and demands of the majority of Latin Americans better than the Washington Consensus did. Our position is not that ideas were the prime movers of neoliberal transformation-interests and institutions were also important-but that the mechanisms for their promulgation have been understudied.
We also argue here that certain similarities can be seen in the way certain key ideas served the interests of a transnational capitalist class throughout Latin America. The process of neoliberal transformation took place in very different ways in different countries in the region. In Chile, neoliberal reform was enacted early, in the 1970s, by a repressive military regime, the process being essentially complete by the advent of civilian rule in 1990. In Mexico and Argentina, rapid reform was initiated by strong presidents in hyper-presidentialist regimes in the early 1990s and the late 1980s respectively, the first formally democratic and the second then a one-party-dominant regime. In Brazil reform basically got under way in the mid-1990s, 10 years after the end of military rule, while in Uruguay partial reforms were enacted even later (Hagopian, 2004: 88) . This article generalizes at a level above these and other differences.
POLANYI VERSUS HAYEK AND BEYOND
The analysis of economic reforms in Latin America is loaded with normative implications. Terminology alone should alert us to this fact. Some writers prefer the term "neoliberalism"; others use "market-oriented," while still others refer to "market fundamentalism." The different designations imply different judgments about the efficacy and fairness of the reforms. In assessing the impacts of reforms, researchers have to choose what to leave in and what to leave out; no set of choices is neutral. As Huber and Solt (2004: 150) point out, assessments of the impacts of neoliberal reform depend on the implicit or explicit counterfactual of the analysis. If the counterfactual is the status quo ante, or the import-substitution-industrialization model in existence from the 1950s to the early 1980s, then the assessment tends to be positive. However, if a model with a more egalitarian distribution of assets and income and more democratic institutions is used, then neoliberalism's many failures become more apparent.
Such disagreements about the direction of economic change are not new. In 1944, both Karl Polanyi and Friedrich von Hayek published their versions of the economic past and future. Polanyi's The Great Transformation (2001 [1944] ) and Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944) offer a fascinating contrast in the diagnosis of and cure for the troubles of the interwar years in Europe.
2 For Polanyi, the Great Depression and the rise of fascism were a reaction to the aggressive liberalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Neoclassical economics treated labor as a factor of production, but labor was expended by people who often demanded recognition and dignity. Competitive markets were not self-regulating but instead often imposed by political fiat, as in Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; large areas of social life were forcibly commodified and made subject to the law of supply and demand. The volatility induced by such a process resulted in a "double movement" of liberalization followed by instability, tension, and reversal. For Polanyi, the double movement was inevitable because markets were not natural; what was natural was people's inclination to resist the subjugation of all aspects of their life chances to market mechanisms. Therefore, for him, history followed a pattern of politically imposed market liberalization (or deregulation) followed by attempts by mass movements and governments to decommodify aspects of social life and reregulate the market. The post-World War II welfare state and social democracy were, for Polanyi, the triumphant second stage of just such a double movement.
For Hayek, it was not excessive liberalism that led to the calamities of the 1930s and 1940s but excessive socialism. Markets were complex, natural, evolving organisms that could not be comprehended by single individuals; what was unnatural was political attempts to interfere with markets. Government attempts to plan economic production and to shield areas of the economy from the rigors of market competition would lead inevitably to greater and greater despotism. Planning-for Polanyi a rational collective response of people anxious to resist the excessive commodification of social life-was for Hayek the "road to serfdom." Markets could function properly only within a "rule of law" in which all individuals and all economic interests were treated by the state with rigorous impartiality and equality. The European welfare state and social democracy were therefore a step in an entirely wrong direction for Hayek, a step that he feared might not be possible to reverse.
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The disagreements between these two thinkers are relevant to contemporary debates about economic reform in Latin America and the rest of the world. Hayek's followers include Milton Friedman, some of the architects of deregulation and the Reagan/Thatcher reforms of the 1980s, and the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick (2002) . Polanyi has his own contemporary admirers, including Joseph Stiglitz, the former chief economist of the World Bank. In our opinion Polanyi's ideas are more relevant to our time than Hayek's. As Robinson (1999: 42) suggests: "We now witness another 'great transformation,' the maturation of transnational capitalism," [since] "the globalization of capitalism seems to be replicating globally the sequence of historic development identified by Polanyi." The very revival of interest in Hayek in the 1970s and 1980s disproves his central idea that government planning and the creation of the welfare state are irreversible and destined to end in tyranny-in fact the opposite happened as neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus gained ascendancy. At the same time, Polanyi's notion of a "double movement" seems to be borne out by contemporary events, for it does seem that Latin America may be entering the second stage of just such a double movement. Conservatives worry that the world has already seen the highwater mark of neoliberal reform (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003) . While analysts of social movements such as Silva (2004: 7-8 ) detect "social mobilization demanding protection from the market" and seeking "fairer distribution of property [and income] . . . higher employment with decent conditions, and wider and better social insurance coverage, among many other needs, such as those built on identity politics," throughout Latin America.
Nevertheless, contemporary debates about neoliberalism are not simple repetitions of the disagreements between Polanyi and Hayek. To be sure, positions in these debates vary in the degree to which markets are seen as efficient and desirable. But there is another axis along which scholars, practitioners, and activists can be arrayed, and that is the degree to which they have faith in the capacity of the nation-state to solve economic problems. What we have today is Polanyi versus Hayek with a twenty-first-century twist, in which arguments about the effectiveness of state intervention in markets are intertwined with a debate about the role and prospects of nation-states in the "globalized" world economy. 4 In the mid-twentieth century, arguments about market failure and volatility led almost inevitably to solutions centered around the nation-state because of the latter's capacity in that era to regulate the national macroeconomy and to control the interface between domestic and international exchange. In the twenty-first century, increasing economic integration on a global scale has led to a questioning of the very distinction between national and international upon which midtwentieth-century policy prescriptions relied and a debate about the capacity of the nation-state to regulate the economy (see, e.g., Mann, 2002; Rodrik, 2000; Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Waltz, 1999) . On one hand, some exponents of "globalization" assert that nation-states should simply get out of the way of privatesector activity (Friedman, 1999) and that increasing the integration of domestic economies into world markets will automatically produce greater internal integration (between sectors and geographic regions and wages, consumption, and production). On the other hand, some critics claim that external integration does not automatically induce internal integration and that some sort of state-led industrial policy is therefore needed (Wade, 2003: 42) . However, not all critics of contemporary markets put their faith in state intervention at the national level. Some are more interested in a redesign of the world's financial and trade "architecture" at the global level, while others argue for the capacity of transnational networks of grassroots activists to address market failures and predatory business practices at the local level. 5 It has also been argued that the current crisis of global capitalism goes beyond the U.S. attempt to rebuild its international hegemony; it is rather a new stage in capitalist development that reflects the rise of a transnational capitalist class, a transnational state, and novel relations of power and inequality at the global level. Within that framework, the Washington Consensus is seen as the means to achieve the hegemony of transnational capital's political project (Robinson, 2005) .
These insights are helpful because the global dimension has often been missing from assessments of the causes and consequences of economic reform in Latin America. Relating the globalization debate to the economic reform controversy raises normative issues because the selection of the outcomes deemed worthy of explanation relies on some sort of values. 6 We agree with the economist and philosopher Amartya Sen (1999: 35-37) that political economy should be a broad field concerned with human welfare and capabilities and not merely the production and exchange of goods and services.
7 And, as Jeremy Waldron (2002: 285) claims, this involves an assessment of arguments about just distribution. Arguments in this field therefore usually combine positive analysis of causal mechanisms in political economy, normative commitments about just distributions of wealth and income, and policy prescriptions. Our own normative position is a critical one that seeks a set of economic policies more egalitarian than the standard neoliberal prescriptions. We make this clear in the following sections, which contain a more in-depth discussion of the tenets of the Washington Consensus and their socioeconomic impact. First, it is important to revisit the role of ideas in policy reform. 
POLICY CONSENSUS AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
On one level, neoliberal reforms in Latin America can be seen as quite superficial. Fundamental problems of inadequate rates of domestic savings, insufficient tax revenues, and disarticulated domestic economies have not been overcome. The region is still highly indebted and heavily dependent on foreign investment, much of it speculative and short-term. This makes volatility a problem. By using an overvalued exchange rate as an anti-inflation anchor, many governments stumbled along in a stop-go cycle in which the overvalued exchange rate hurt exports, leading to foreign-exchange shortages and an eventual and disastrous devaluation. High interest rates designed to attract foreign investment further inhibit productive investment. The complex is sometimes labeled the "Mexican disease" (Taylor, 1999) , but the diagnosis is instantly recognizable as a more general Latin American one. Furthermore, growth has slowed recently. Popular support for the reforms is soft and has varied over time. A number of studies have accounted for apparent contradictions and paradoxes in the initial social reactions to reformist policies. Public opinion surveys have provided records of variations over time and across countries. At the aggregate regional level and in terms of societies' expectations, the meaning and consolidation prospects of democracy have been closely linked to governments' ability to guarantee good economic performance. A survey taken in Latin America as early as 1999 showed that only 40 percent of respondents believed that "production should be left to the private sector" and only 11.8 percent agreed that "the country's economic problems are being solved" (Wall Street Journal Americas, 1999) . Today only 27 percent of Latin Americans are satisfied with the performance of market-oriented economies, though this percentage represents an increment of 8 percent over the 19 percent registered a year ago. However, 63 percent of Latin Americans consider that a market-oriented economy is the only economic system that can lead to development, and this figure has been increasing since 2003. 8 Furthermore, in many countries reforms have rewarded highly concentrated financial conglomerates rather than manufacturing enterprises (which would support the idea that reforms were enacted primarily to satisfy the transnational capitalist class's interests); most Latin American economies run a trade deficit with the United States, and few of them have moved aggressively into high-value-added manufactured exports. Privatizations have sometimes succeeded only in transferring public monopolies to private hands. Regulation of the newly privatized firms has been patchy. In many countries there has also been a deterioration of educational standards and systems of public health.
Despite these pressing problems, there appears not to be on the horizon a Keynesian-style grand synthesis of neoliberal prescriptions for growth that preserves the gains of the past 30 years, attacks the region's pressing social problems, and ensures against excessive volatility. Rebuilding the old consensus is neither possible nor desirable; what is needed is new coalitions based on the interests of majorities. Nevertheless, most governments continue to muddle through with ad hoc solutions and tend not to come up with proactive (and pragmatic) measures to stabilize their economies until it is too late. In 30 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES most cases, governments have also been too slow to acknowledge social protest against reforms. Given this picture, how can we analyze the current crisis of efforts to maintain market-oriented policies in the region? One helpful perspective is to focus attention on the generation, diffusion, and adoption of a set of ideas about economic policy and, most important, on why the elite consensus achieved in the 1980s did not hold. This seems particularly relevant if we are to say something about the content of future economic policy in the region. Seen from this angle, the first question is therefore how neoliberal ideas became accepted by policy elites and incorporated into policies as crucial components of a new development strategy. This is an aspect of the process of reform that has been relatively little studied, but its relevance has been acknowledged from several perspectives. Indeed, after reviewing alternative explanations for reform, Haggard and Kaufman (1992: 36) conclude:
In the final analysis, it is entirely possible that neither interest-based explanations nor institutional ones will be entirely satisfactory for explaining how societies cope with the challenges of policy reform and consolidation. Consolidation may also require the evolution of a broader ideational consensus among leaders, interest groups, party elites, and attentive publics that sets some boundaries on the range of economic debate. Long-term sustainability of policy choices will depend on a convergence of thinking about fundamental means-ends relationships in the economy. Then, the formation of elite preferences, ideas, and ideology, as well as the evolution of public opinion, are potentially important explanatory variables.
In addition, studies about the impact of ideas on economic and foreign policy making highlight the relevance of ideas, particularly in reference to processes of substantial policy innovation such as the neoliberal turn examined here. Peter Hall (1989: 361) argues, "It is ideas, in the form of economic theories and the policies developed from them, that enable national leaders to chart a course through turbulent economic times, and ideas about what is efficient, expedient, and just that motivate the movement from one line of policy to another." Comparative research indicates that there are at least three ways in which ideas may influence policy outcomes. Ideas may serve as road maps, helping actors to assess their preferences and the alternatives available to reach their goals. They may affect strategic interactions by facilitating or hindering cooperative efforts. They may also have a long-lasting influence once they become institutionalized, thus constraining future policy choices (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993) . Undoubtedly, the capacity of the neoliberal discourse to provide a simple answer to the crisis of the 1980s illustrates the impact of ideas on policy makers' actions. The crisis helped to undermine the already discredited policies of the past and opened a window of opportunity for new ideas. Despite some criticism and resistance, the exhaustion of import-substitution industrialization, the failure of heterodox experiments, and the sense of urgency generated by a deepening economic crisis paved the way for a relatively widespread acquiescence in policy innovation.
The literature on structural reforms in Latin America has, however, only indirectly addressed ideational issues. There are extensive studies on the role of technocrats or technocratic teams who, acting in tandem with strong executives Margheritis and Pereira / SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO NEOLIBERALISM 31 in the most aggressive cases of reform in the region, became the "transmission belts" for the diffusion and implementation of policy recommendations. They embodied the consensus and worked as amalgamators of different interests within the new governing coalitions (Centeno and Silva, 1998) . These studies clearly provide us with a grounded explanation of the diffusion of ideas. As Hall (1989: 390) reminds us, "ideas have real power in the political world, but they do not acquire political force independently of the constellation of institutions and interests already present there." Furthermore, technocratic cadres are part of the rising transnational elite who are now pursuing a post-Washington Consensus as one way of solving global economic problems and securing the legitimacy of the capitalist system (Robinson, 2005) . However, a critical cadre of officials was sometimes absent or failed to obtain the necessary political support, and in these cases the reform attempt failed (e.g., Venezuela under Carlos Andrés Pérez, 1989 Pérez, -1993 . Also, looking at those actors and their positions in the decision-making structures does not tell us much about the ideas they promoted. The policies recently adopted in Latin America did not originate in the region; technocrats imported them from developed countries. The consensus formed around the new policy orientation emanated mainly from intellectual and policy circles in the United States and was endorsed by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Thus, although the insights provided by studies on technocrats' socialization and professional networks are relevant, we need to know more about the links and alliances between domestic and foreign policy elites that provided the basis for a new coalition with vested interests in the reforms and the mechanisms through which their shared views contributed to the formation of widespread consensus. In fact, those links were not a new phenomenon. The promotion of neoliberal policies in Latin America by the United States can be seen as part of a long-term process of expansion, rebuilding, and consolidation of U.S. hegemony. The technocrats mentioned above resemble the U.S. consultants who promoted laissez-faire ideas across the region from 1890 to 1920 (Drake, 2000) . Then and now, economic policy consensus served the hegemon's interest by persuading subordinate states to accept certain rules of the game, this time reinforced by a new enforcement mechanism (financial conditionality) and complemented by a renewed impulse toward the promotion of democracy. Yet, according to Robinson (2005) , what the current attempt entails is not another round of old-style imperialism but rather new and more subtle forms of global capitalist domination. In his words (1999: 44) , Neoliberalism is the "grease" by which global capitalism tears down all nonmarket structures that have in the past placed limits on, or acted as a protective layer against, the accumulation of capital. By prying open and making accessible to transnational capital every layer of the social fabric, neoliberalism extricates the global economy from global society, and the state defers to the market as the sole organizing power in the economic and social sphere.
Another explanation, suggested by international relations and political economy specialists concerned with questions of order and governance at the international level, focuses on policy convergence. The adoption of similar practices in the realm of economic policy making first in advanced 32 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES democracies and later in the developing world has been seen as a new source of international order in a time of crisis of hegemony and disintegration of international regimes (Biersteker, 1992; Phillips and Higgott, 1999) . In other words, policy convergence could help to maintain international order in the post-cold-war scenario by establishing a patterned regularity in domestic and foreign economic policy that would facilitate governance in the international political economy. This approach provides an interesting framework for understanding the links between domestic and international factors. However, the policyconvergence thesis is incapable of explaining the nonelite dimension of the process of consensus building at the domestic level, and its predictions have proved wrong. Policy makers have realized that, if reforms are to be maintained and deepened in the long run, they have to generate broader social support (Armijo and Faucher, 2002) . The literature on the politics of reforms indicates that policy makers face a great challenge during the phase of consolidation of policy innovations, when the new rules of the game have to be made permanent and widely accepted (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995) . The new rules have to be incorporated into social actors' perceptions as credible and beneficial in order to work as incentives to modify their behavior and generate political support for the new order. This implies that policy consensus has to be built within countries and reflect the expectations and aspirations of majorities. International relations scholars are looking at the process the other way around: whether and how policy convergence may have an impact on international order. They are not concerned with the complex dynamic of policy formation in each specific country. Therefore they cannot account for an aspect of the process that has become crucial nowadays in Latin America, rebuilding some sort of consensus for a new economic model that goes beyond the limitations of the neoliberal one and is able to satisfy the needs and aspirations of majorities.
Also, intellectual speculation at the beginning of the process included a large dose of optimism. A large number of scholars, as well as practitioners, embraced the change with enthusiasm, hoping that neoliberal policies would bring prosperity and greater integration of Latin American economies into the now globalized international system. The new economic orientation, supported by increasing policy convergence, was expected to open new possibilities for the developing countries in general to benefit from international trade and capital (Biersteker, 1992: 128-129; Edwards, 1995) . Little attention was paid to particular contextual conditions, political constraints, and the characteristics and impact of the transition itself. Dissenters were deemed ignorant or not au courant. However, reality proved more complex than this. The results largely diverged across countries and failed to meet expectations.
Therefore, some questions arise about the ideational framework that has shaped those policy recommendations. What was the nature and scope of the policy convergence? How did the neoliberal consensus emerge, and how has it evolved? What are the implications of the current disarray of ideas on development strategies? Moreover, the fact that no strong policy alternatives have emerged in the region despite widespread discontent and frustration raises the question why the consensus about market-oriented reforms is still so influential.
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THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
Adapting Melanson's (1991) definition, policy consensus is defined here as a substantial elite agreement about the grand design, strategy, and tactics of economic policy. Such an agreement about free-market-oriented policies developed in the mid-1980s in Latin America 9 because of the confluence of interests and ideas. As Robinson (1999: 64) put it, It [the Washington Consensus] was indeed a consensus because it represented a congruence of interests among the hemisphere's dominant groups, and these interests were being advanced through institutions that command power (the hemisphere's states and the international financial institutions). The consensus also achieved ideological hegemony by setting the parameters for, and the limits to, debate among subordinate groups on options and alternative projects for the hemisphere.
Although it is plausible to argue that the "grand design" was adapted to national circumstances and strategies and tactics differed across countries, it is possible to identify a set of measures that characterized the neoliberal turn, among them a belief in the efficiency of market mechanisms and the need to reduce or reverse the state's involvement in the economy (Biersteker, 1990) . This policy recommendation emanated from the IMF and the World Bank and was reinforced by financial conditionality.
John Williamson (1990) summarized the main components of that policy recommendation in a list of 10 economic reforms that he labeled "the Washington Consensus." By "Washington" he meant the political members of the U.S. administration, the technocrats in the international financial institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank) and economic agencies of the U.S. government, and policy specialists at think tanks based in that city. The consensus reflected a collective positive view about the benefits of prudent macroeconomic policies, outward-orientation, and free-market capitalism. It was based on 10 policy instruments rather than objectives or outcomes, and the agreement did not go beyond the list. In fact, the details of implementation did not generate unanimous consent but were subject to qualifications (Williamson, 1990: 7-19) . The instruments proposed were (1) fiscal discipline, (2) reordering of public expenditure priorities, (3) tax reform, (4) financial liberalization so as to attain positive market-determined interest rates, (5) competitive market-determined exchange rates, (6) import liberalization, (7) promotion of foreign direct investment, (8) privatization of state-owned enterprises, (9) deregulation, and (10) provision of secure property rights.
Several important influences on the formation of this consensus have been identified (Krugman, 1995; Naím, 1999; Drake, 2000) . The first is academic studies produced during the 1960s and 1970s, many of which were sharply critical of the import-substitution strategy. The second is the surprising rise of new industrializing countries (especially, the East Asian economies), whose rapid growth and outstanding economic export performance in some manufacturing sectors called previous assumptions about development into question. The third is the decline and collapse of centrally planned economies, which had a similar effect. The fourth and final one is the debt crisis. The economic turmoil it provoked discredited previous policies and favored more 34 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES receptive attitudes in developing countries toward financial conditionality, austerity, and structural adjustment. For policy elites in those countries, adopting reforms represented the only way of regaining credibility and access to international capital. This largely explains the appeal of the Washington Consensus at the domestic decision-making level.
In practice, though, the international financial institutions' one-size-fits-all recipe was not applied in a pure way. Structural reforms in the developing world in general and Latin America in particular involved a mix of economic liberalization and some form of state protectionism and intervention that reflected the political process that characterized their implementation. Government's need to provide incentives to winners and compensation to losers in order to cope with the dynamics of support and opposition to policy innovation determined not only the content of economic policy but also the modality of its implementation. In all cases the executive branch of government initiated the transformations, but while in some cases the executive, backed by technocrats, employed the institutional and political resources at hand to advance rapidly and unilaterally with the changes, in other cases a slower dynamic of negotiations and compromise was followed. As a result, despite the fact that foreign pressure in the form of conditionality affected all countries, not all of them embraced neoliberalism wholeheartedly, and in several cases there were setbacks.
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Latin American leaders were doubtless encouraged by an international environment that was particularly propitious for the diffusion of the Washington Consensus. The reorganization of the international economic order as part of a broader process of transnational development in which structures of production, finance, and political governance had become integrated at the global level provided a favorable environment for the advance of the Washington Consensus ideas (Robinson, 2001) . The financial conditionality exerted by the international financial institutions was an important source of external influence on the adoption of its recommendations in developing countries. However, the variety of responses suggests that international pressure per se cannot be the main explanation for the adoption of neoliberalism across regions. It would also be incorrect to talk of the simple imposition of certain policies. External pressure was mediated by domestic interests and choices made by leaders and key social groups. In fact, the extent to which international pressure was effective is debatable. For instance, Kahler (1992) suggests that, despite power asymmetries, the international financial institutions found it difficult to enforce conditionality for reasons related to domestic politics in debtor countries (e.g., political instability, constraints arising from the distribution of gains and losses, deficient administrative structures) and to the creditors' own problems and shortcomings, among them multiple and conflicting goals, difficulties in implementing a coordinated strategy, information deficits, and ineffective monitoring.
Therefore, it seems relevant to look at the interplay of domestic and international factors. Studies about the kind and scope of transnational networks of interests and actors are the most enlightening in this respect. For instance, Kahler (1992: 123-131) argues that influence works not only through power relations and bargaining but also through persuasion. Since the mid-1980s, the international financial institutions have promoted a policy dialogue in order to build a common base of consensual knowledge. This process would allow the establishment of close links with those in developing countries who shared the
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institutions' views (generally, technocrats), induce learning on the part of governments by defining their interests and strategies in a different way, and promote the formation of transnational elite alliances mentioned above. In the same vein, Stallings (1992) argues that international factors are crucial in explaining broad shifts in policy and variations through time and across countries. Building on a concept used earlier by the dependency school, she also suggests that economic, political, and ideological linkages between domestic groups and international actors, together with markets and leverage, have been an important mechanism of international influence. Interest-based and cultural ties link domestic groups (e.g., businesspeople, technocrats, the military, and the middle classes) to those in developed countries, generating networks of interests, mutual identification, and policy convergence and providing fertile ground for a proreformist coalition. The effectiveness of these networks varies according to the degree of openness of the economy (reliance on international flows of trade, finance, information, etc.) and the existence of external constraints (conditions in international markets, economic crisis, etc.).
Indeed, Latin American countries have opened their economies since the mid-1980s, and new opportunities for the formation of transnational networks and elite alliances have emerged. Drawing on the accumulated comparative evidence, Teichman (2001: 56-61 ) describes these recent linkages in detail. She traces the formation of the policy consensus to the previous involvement of the international financial institutions in the region and particularly to organizational and personnel changes in the World Bank that enhanced its ability to exert influence on economic policy making. The cultivation of close relationships between officials from the bank and public officials in the debtor countries reinforced trust and friendship ties and facilitated their working together in the negotiation of structural adjustment loans. Agreement was favored by the rise to key decision-making positions in Latin American governments of economists with degrees from U.S. universities, who had educational and professional backgrounds similar to those of the bank's officials and in some cases had even worked for multilateral institutions. These training and career experiences made them ideologically attuned to the institutions' proposals. In addition, the policy dialogue encouraged by the bank in the form of informal discussions, presentation of reports or studies, research and publications, and technical advice and training contributed to the formation of a "policy culture" and homogeneous and cohesive networks. These transnational elites, representing the interests of international capital and bureaucratic agencies, occupied key positions in the structures of governments, and their decision-making power enabled them to carry out a restructuring of national economies, opening them to transnational capital (Robinson, 2004) .
Nonetheless, as explained above, for ideas to become policies they have to appeal to powerful interest groups. Thus, the policy consensus really became consolidated when Latin American governments proved able to forge supporting (and winning) coalitions. International creditors (the banks that had engaged in soft lending in the previous decade) became partners with domestic economic groups that benefited from reforms, especially large ones that already enjoyed a considerable degree of diversification and internationalization and thus could flexibly adapt to the new scenario. Their leverage in economic policy making increased, along with their capacity to shape the public 36 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES debate, and together they represented an important counterforce to opposing less advantaged social groups. To some extent, this is a manifestation of a global process of restructuring of class relations: the correlation of social forces has been altered in favor of the capitalist sector (Robinson, 1999; . In sum, during the 1980s and early 1990s the Washington Consensus became conventional wisdom. A new cycle of dominant ideas was in place, and disagreement was underestimated or silenced. Despite the limits on economists' knowledge about what makes a development strategy successful and the absence of conclusive evidence, the policy prescriptions mentioned above gained momentum. As Krugman (1995) suggests, they were based on a selective reading of history, but the fact that they were embraced by a considerable number of influential people was crucial in guaranteeing their acceptance and the dismissal of previous and/or opposed ideas. Opposition groups and emerging social movements found it difficult to force a change in policy orientation (Robinson, 1999) . In this respect, it was not different from previous consensuses, such as the one formed around Keynes's ideas in the postwar years or the pre-1930s freemarket orthodoxy. In Krugman's (1995: 724) words, Thinking about development generally takes place in a kind of village of bankers, policy-makers, and policy intellectuals (rarely including the academic researchers), who meet each other frequently, read each other's articles and speeches, and generally constitute a quite close-knit community. It has often been observed that such interlocking social groupings tend at any given time to converge on a conventional wisdom, about economics among many other things.
REFORM POLICY: RECOMMENDATIONS REFORMED
The apparently robust and indisputable character of the Washington Consensus began to be questioned during the 1990s. Strong criticisms coming from within and outside the international financial institutions led to reformulation of the main policy recommendations. Indeed, one of the most striking characteristics of the Washington Consensus is the almost continuous revision of its premises. In a relatively short period of time, several elements were added to the core described above and others modified. Less than generating a new consensus, they added uncertainty about what policies are desirable and viable. Thus, Naím (1999) has coined the phrase "Washington Confusion" to refer to this new stage in the evolution of the consensus.
The disagreement involved not only questions of implementation (e.g., the pace and sequence of reforms) but also the nature of economic measures (e.g., whether to apply controls on foreign capital or which exchange-rate regime was preferable). Also, some new (so-called second-generation) reforms aimed to improve the levels of competition within economies by means, for instance, of better regulatory frameworks, the strengthening of institutions, and reform of the judicial system (Naím, 1995) . These controversies marked the evolution of the conventional wisdom on market reforms. According to Naím (1999) , it is possible to identify four phases of that evolution. The first involved a shift in the debate about economics and development and the adoption of orthodox macroeconomic policies together with the dismantling of past interventionist measures. The second, around the mid-1990s, involved the "discovery Margheritis and Pereira / SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO NEOLIBERALISM 37
of institutions"-the recognition that macroeconomic structural reforms were necessary but not sufficient and institutional reforms were an indispensable complement of the working of markets. 11 The third was associated with financial crises in several regions in the late 1990s and prompted a redefinition of the instruments that might help countries to cope with the undesirable consequences of globalization. The last stage of this evolution is marked by the reconsideration of what development in a broad sense requires and what it would take to answer current political, social, and economic demands.
In other words, ideas evolved in parallel with reality, accounting for or responding to political and economic processes that contradicted or went beyond previous expectations. While initial revisions of the Washington Consensus were more along the line of adding new elements than changing the premises (Stiglitz, 1998; Burki and Perry, 1997; , poor economic performance, financial crisis, and political opposition led to a critical examination of the original policy recommendations themselves and an attempt to save the main premises by designing a post-Washington Consensus more sensitive to the social debt (Williamson, 1999; Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003) .
Two main interrelated lessons emerge from these revisions. First, development involves more than macroeconomic stability and GDP growth. The preservation of the environment, the consolidation of democratic practices, the building up of transparent and accountable institutions, and the implementation of social policies to attain equity are all goals that have to be included in any development strategy. Second, any policy prescription has to be grounded in a complementary understanding of both the political and the economic processes involved in structural transformations. Considering states and markets as unrelated and opposed leads to an incomplete and misleading assessment of what it takes to reform a socioeconomic order.
Indeed, most of the ongoing efforts to give shape to a new consensual agenda focus on institutional issues, social equity, and inclusiveness. To a large extent, this agenda looks very similar to the old recipe with social programs stirred in. Researchers from two think tanks in Washington (the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Inter-American Dialogue) have produced one of the most complete reformulations of the consensus, suggesting "ten plus one" new policy recommendations to move beyond it and accommodate "a new and overriding objective [that] has emerged: to reduce poverty and improve equity without sacrificing growth" (Birdsall and de la Torre, 2001: 3). These recommendations include working on the following areas: (1) establishing rule-based fiscal discipline, (2) smoothing booms and busts, (3) developing social safety nets that are triggered automatically, (4) providing schools for the poor, (5) taxing the rich and spending more on the rest, (6) giving small business a chance, (7) protecting workers' rights, (8) dealing openly with discrimination, (9) repairing land markets, (10) providing consumer-driven public services, and (11) reducing rich-country protectionism. This last point reflects the increasing recognition in Washington circles of the responsibilities of developed countries, which go beyond trade openness to involve redesigning the international financial architecture in a way that reduces financial volatility and contagion effects in times of crises, increasing foreign aid to developing countries, and promoting investment in projects with high social returns (Lora and Panizza, 2002) .
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In general, these recommendations suggest that it is time to move beyond the Washington Consensus to target problems of social equity, but the authors acknowledge that there is no consensus on how to achieve this: "On the formulation of each tool there can be endless debate. What exactly to do-and how to do it-are much more contentious for the items in our toolkit than they were for the 10 instruments of the Washington Consensus" (Birdsall and de la Torre, 2001: 14) . Moreover, they admit that they do not address the crucial problem of how to build the necessary constituency for equity, that is, how to get the support not only of the poor but also of the middle and upper classes. This is a key point if policy makers are to implement a really democratic and equitable development strategy.
New "conditional cash transfer" schemes have been applauded by some as successful approaches to poverty alleviation, much better than traditional pension programs, which disproportionally benefit upper-income groups. Examples are the Bolsa Família program in Brazil, which provides basic income to poor families, and the similar Oportunidades program in Mexico (Economist, 2005) . However, it is probably too early to tell whether these kinds of programs can be politically sustained and whether they can have a deep impact on poverty and inequality in the countries where they are introduced.
Further redefinition of the Washington Consensus has recently been undertaken by its original advocates. During the past few years, studies have repeatedly addressed the question of what went wrong with the original formulation (Williamson, 1999; Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003) . They argue that some developments were not foreseen and, consequently, developing countries were not warned against the negative consequences of certain policies or were even encouraged to pursue them (e.g., capital markets liberalization, currency overvaluation, fixed-exchange-rate regimes).
12 These "policy mistakes" increased the vulnerability of their economies to external shocks and ultimately undermined economic performance. Also, these analyses suggest that results lagged behind expectations largely because the reformist process was not complete. Some of the first-generation reforms were only partially implemented, while second-generation reforms have been indefinitely postponed or neglected. Finally, these studies admit that the original consensus focused on too narrow a goal (economic growth), thus underestimating the importance of equity considerations. Accordingly, a new agenda is proposed. It is based on four elements: (1) reducing vulnerability to crises, (2) completing the first-generation reforms, (3) carrying out second-generation reforms, and (4) implementing income-distribution policies.
However, within the ranks of the defenders of the consensus, there is not much elaboration of where these reformulations would lead us and how they might be adapted to specific national contexts. Also, it is not clear to what extent the evolution of ideas analyzed above has been translated into substantive policy changes.
THE CURRENT DEBATE
The deterioration of the Washington Consensus has clearly affected the reputation and role of the international financial institutions. Strong criticisms Margheritis and Pereira / SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO NEOLIBERALISM 39 emerged after the financial crises of the second half of the 1990s. These institutions' policy recommendations and performance as implementers of financial conditionality have been seriously questioned, as well as their capacity to adapt their original goals, instruments, and structure to a new international environment (Clark, 1996) . The discussion has even touched on whether to retain them now that the postwar order in which they were fashioned no longer exists. Specifically, the appropriate scope of IMF policy conditionality has been vigorously debated in terms of its costs for developing countries, effects on potential borrowers and foreign investors, equal treatment of countries, ineffective crisis management, and poor enforcement (Goldstein, 2000) . Both the IMF and the World Bank have also been accused of encouraging policies that do not work and harm the poor, applying a market-oriented perspective in a doctrinaire way, imposing austerity on debtor countries, recommending identical programs irrespective of countries' circumstances and local governments' opinions, having no influence over governments of advanced countries, bailing out the commercial banks, failing to foresee and manage financial crises, merely responding to the interests of international finance, and suffering from lack of coordination, overlap of functions, organizational overexpansion, and bureaucratic deficiencies (Krueger, 1998) .
The international financial institutions have been responding to these claims to a certain extent.
13 As a result, part of the core of the original Washington Consensus remains intact and still enjoys generalized acceptance when it comes to policy implementation (Broad, 2003; Gore, 2000) . This is particularly true in the case of trade liberalization. Financial liberalization is probably the recommendation most attacked. It is acknowledged that government regulation is often necessary and desirable, and advocates of privatization now admit its shortcomings. In sum, the debate over ideas has eroded the Washington Consensus and led to some shifts in policy, but the latter seem to be relatively small. For instance, the debate about a new international financial architecture has remained focused on preserving the conditions of free capital mobility rather than producing significant political changes in the way global financial flows are regulated (Soederberg, 2001; Cartapanis and Herland, 2002) . From this perspective, the current discussion about capital controls has to be understood as an insufficient political response to increasing systemic instability aimed at reinventing and relegitimating the prescription of financial liberalization. This is consistent with the criticism by Robinson (2005: 318-320) of the whole set of proposals to save the Washington Consensus coming from within as part of a fragmented and at times incoherent response to the ongoing crisis of global capitalism.
Indeed, this discussion includes serious dissent on the part of elites and circles that do not radically depart from the liberal consensus. Influential individuals and institutions in Washington have manifested their disagreement with the international financial institutions' performance.
14 This dissent coincides with the coming to power in Latin America of center-left leaders who promise to compensate their societies for or reverse the negative consequences of structural adjustment policies (e.g., Lula in Brazil, Gutiérrez in Ecuador, Chávez in Venezuela, Kirchner in Argentina, Vásquez in Uruguay), but it does not question market-oriented policies. On the contrary, it seeks to continue on the same path,
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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES though applying some unorthodox measures, and it has produced no alternative international institutions or arrangements. Many reforms have been proposed. For example, Barry and Reddy (2005) suggest linking trade to respect for labor rights and the environment, and Reddy (2005) suggests an international-level mechanism, such as a global reinsurance scheme, to insure developing countries against the risk of increased demands for social protection in the wake of economic instability. The debate about the future of these and other proposals is still unsettled. In the meantime, the ball is again in each individual government's court, creating pressure to pursue further domestic reforms. It is worth noting that criticisms extend well beyond intellectual and policy circles and encompass specific groups in the South and the North voicing the demands of environmental institutions, workers, women, minorities, and antipoverty and antiglobalization movements, as well as broad publics in developing countries (Broad, 2003; Broad and Cavanagh, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002) . This reaction has been increasingly intense in Latin America, where diverse social movements have translated the claims of those suffering from increasing social inequality, polarization, and poverty (Robinson, 1999; . In general terms, they question the impact of globalization and the excessive focus of current policies on market institutions as the best mechanism for achieving development. They also make a case for growth with equity. Institutions such as the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean share their concern over wider goals and values and the need to establish a new relationship between the market and the public interest. The World Social Forum has gone farther in claiming that free trade does not guarantee wealth and development and that financial liberalization has increased global inequality and has been the main cause of financial crises and contagion. The Forum has also claimed that the power and activities of transnational corporations should be controlled, the international financial institutions should be reformed to make them more transparent and accountable and increase the participation of developing countries in their decisions, and new lending mechanisms should be implemented to deal with the problem of external debt, including a substantial reduction of the amount owed (Lora and Panizza, 2002: 34-37) .
In other words, the disagreement is not just about policy tools but about whose interests the consensus represents and what goals economic policies should pursue. Analysts agree that the discussion is not settled but are divided as to whether the globalization backlash will be able to force a vibrant new debate in which both developed and developing countries will be involved (Gore, 2000; Phillips and Higgott, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002) . Given the inability of social movements to force change in national, regional, and international structures, this question remains open. It is not clear yet whether critical forces within Latin American societies will be able to develop a viable counterhegemonic program, take advantage of systemic contradictions, and effectively use the new transnational spaces to contest the current logic of global capitalism (Robinson, 1999; .
A new consensus on economic policy making must certainly embody the claims and aspirations of Latin Americans. A cosmetic revision of the Washington Consensus is clearly insufficient for various reasons. On the one hand, some factors that facilitated the acceptance of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s (e.g., simplicity, persuasiveness, promise of improvement, cogency, impartiality) are absent today. Complexity, confusion, distrust, uncertainty, impotence, and frustration are the elements that characterize the current debate. On the other hand, the comparative evidence on reforms in Latin America suggests that a new consensus cannot be based outside the region and needs different mechanisms for obtaining support. During the past 25 years, Latin American elites have been playing a more reactive role in the adoption of ideas than in previous decades, and no clear, powerful, and viable alternative proposals to the Washington Consensus have emerged. In addition, none of the reformist governments-much less the most aggressive ones, including "the liars"
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-have done a very good job in persuading the public, building consensus from the bottom. Some economic results, such as monetary stabilization, have had a positive impact on the public in general, and some improvement in the provision of public services has gathered social sympathy. Yet, except for some specific interest groups that benefited from the changes, modest, negative, and disappointing results have contributed to society's sense of exclusion from a model that was not designed to benefit majorities.
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In short, the consensus developed from the circulation of ideas in relatively closed, homogeneous, and self-reinforcing transnational circles of intellectuals and policy advisors but never developed strong roots in local societies. It represented the interests and strategies of the transnational capitalist sector, for which the opening of the economies was functional to their growth and transborder expansion. It also served well the interests of local elites, trapped in institutional, political, and economic instability and lack of resources. In addition, one of the factors that was key to the initial success of the Washington Consensus at the level of elites (e.g., its becoming conventional wisdom in policy circles) proved to be the source of failure in the long run because the diffusion and adoption of ideas never reached broader audiences. The inherently conflictive and exclusionary character of neoliberalism (with or without a social face) would always be at odds with democratic egalitarian values and therefore unlikely to appeal and difficult to sell to the disfranchised. The current social mood in the region would make unlikely the rebuilding of consensus on the same principles and through the same mechanisms used for its original dissemination and is likely to produce still more revisions and pragmatic adaptations of the economic policies. In democratic Latin America, economic policy can be legitimized only if it addresses the concerns of majorities.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that Latin America is still confronting old problems and also new ones, some of them exacerbated by the reforms (Ffrench-Davis, 2000) . The policy recommendations promoted by the international financial institutions have lost credibility as adequate tools for solving these problems. In other words, the Washington Consensus cannot work as a road map any longer. In order to guide policy again, a new consensus has to be able to respond to current demands. Disenchantment with the inability of democratic governments to address the needs of majorities is making constituencies less prone to acquiesce to delegative practices, thus making it more difficult to advance with pending reforms and/or try new alternatives.
It goes without saying that this is not only a question of procedures. A new consensus has to correspond with societies' beliefs and values and has to generate hope. Only if it can re-create positive expectations about the future and the possibilities of collective improvement will it be able to gather social support. Once again, historical comparative research reinforces this point. One of the characteristics of the postwar Keynesian consensus was that it embodied ideas that facilitated a compromise among social classes. Those ideas were phrased in a language that allowed diverse interest groups to formulate a common program. They also invoked the state as a primary player in social and economic relations (Hall, 1989: 366) . The Washington Consensus, in contrast, was an elitist model framed in technocratic language that only experts could decipher and ruled out the role of the state as mediator of social conflict. Thus, it did not favor the formation of multiclass supporting coalitions. The exclusionary character of neoliberal policies ultimately undermined their legitimacy and made reform consolidation and sustainability less likely. Any new consensus will require a substantial change in policy content-much more substantial than the one involved in the revisionist proposals. The ideas that may give place to a new consensus have to be appealing to broad majorities so as to facilitate political compromises and a sense of a collective project.
The crisis of the Washington Consensus is not over. The current debate suggests that we may well be in the middle of a paradigm shift that involves ideational reelaboration of development strategies in general. The new ideas that may guide economic policy in the future are not completely clear. The analysis presented here suggests that they will probably be a combination of old ideas and a few new initiatives. (The renewed interest in the proper role of the state is a good example.) It remains to be seen whether such a blending will attract the necessary attention from policy makers and the social support of majorities.
CONCLUSION
After more than two decades of research on the implementation of economic reforms in Latin America, our knowledge of the role of ideas in the reforms is still limited, largely because debate about their ideational underpinnings was lacking for more than a decade. The reforms were eventually contested, but only after some of their most negative impact on societies was evident did the discussion of alternatives emerge. Scholars are today trying to analyze a vast sea change that is connected to core issues in social science such as the relationship between patterns of economic development and democracy. Positive analysis is taking place in a context of heated normative debates about the impacts of neoliberal reform. The Polanyi-Hayek debate about the proper role of states and markets has become more complex as it has become intertwined with related disagreements about the capacity and proper role of nation-states in the world economy. In this respect, the current debate can be seen as part of the cyclical history of development studies, which have historically swung between market-centered and state-centered paradigms.
The so-called Washington Consensus of the 1980s and 1990s was appealing because it was a simple and straightforward set of tools offered in a time of crisis. The influence of transnational technocratic elites and international institutions was crucial to the advancement of policy innovations. Creating a new consensus for current problems based on different principles may prove much more difficult today, given the resilience of the neoliberal programs, the absence of concrete alternative proposals, the complexity of contemporary problems, the apparent lack of a common crisis across countries, and the skepticism of Latin Margheritis and Pereira / SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO NEOLIBERALISM 43
